《The philosophy of envy》這本書，把Envious 和 Jealous這兩種情緒，做了以下的區別：
So while both emotions are rivalrous and competitive, the jealous sees the rival as attempting to take away what is rightfully theirs, whereas the envious sees the rival as having something they (the agent) want. While the envious may think they have a right to it, that is not a necessary feature of the emotion, and bystanders often disagree and see the envious in the negative light of an aggressor more often than not. This difference with regard to perceived entitlement and justice of the gap between the agent and the target explains the different societal attitude toward the two emotions.
大意是說，雖然jealous 和 envious都是一種比較的、充滿敵對的情緒，然而jealous比較是主人翁覺得他的敵對者，奪取了他所應當有權擁有的東西，至於envious 則是主人翁看到他的敵對者，擁有他想要卻沒有的東西。
如果把jealous 和 envious翻譯中文為「嫉妒」和「羨慕」，或許能更貼近社會上對這兩種情緒的感受和看法。
嫉妒(Jealousy)代表一種擁有的失去(loss)，而羨慕(Envy)則代表一種未擁有的一種欠缺（Lack)，這就是所謂的Lack versus loss model。
然而，有時候嫉妒和羨慕的情緒是會同時存在的。
譬如，愛人被搶了，主人翁失去所愛，故而嫉妒；而主人翁的對手現在擁有了愛人，主人翁欠缺了戀人的愛，那一種欠缺，所以羨慕。只是一般大家往往看到的，比較是嫉妒而不是羨慕了。
《The philosophy of envy》談的重點是羨慕(Envy)，那麼這種情緒是怎麼產生的呢？
羨慕的根源在於比較(comparison)，佛家則講得更廣泛，叫做分別心。
社交媒體的興起，讓我們有更快的比較，更多的分別心：
Instagram, Facebook, and all the other social media are replete with people boasting about their good fortune, talents, and achievements, and they become mirrors on the wall who constantly refuse to tell us that we are the fairest in the land. D’Arms and Jacobson, in making their case that many goods that are central to flourishing are necessarily dependent on social comparison, claim: “Part of the desire to achieve is surely an aspiration to excellence, and excellence in various endeavors – from scholarship to the arts, industry, even athletics – contributes to human flourishing. Yet which accomplishments count as excellent, or sufficiently good to be worthy of pride, is largely a function of performance of others( especially those who are nearby)…
大意是說，在社交媒體上充斥著宣揚自己有多麼棒的各種貼文。
有研究認為，這種社會上的各種比較，大家都希望比別人做得更好，是人類向上進步的力量，
問題是，東西不比較，不知其好不好：
Some things cannot be good (and hence are not properly judged to be good） without some people doing better than others. The comparison here is metaphysically and logically necessary. This is the case of positional goods, which are defined as “goods the absolute value of which, to their possessors, depends on those possessors’ place in the distribution of the good – on their relative standing with respect to the good in question” （Brighouse and Swift 2006, 474). A standard example of a positional good is honor: to be honorable in a certain society means to be anointed, to be given a social status that is higher than other people’s. To be in any honor association is valuable precisely because not everybody gets in – only a small portion of individuals gets in and that is where its value stems from.
大意是說，比較之後才知道有多好的東西，是所謂的地位財(Positional goods)，譬如金錢和汽車，比較它在分佈的哪個位置，來決定有多好。
「榮譽」是一種典型的地位財，只有相對少數的人才會被賦予(按：譬如諾貝爾獎、榮譽博士、榮譽市民等等)
Other typical examples of positional goods are connected to social status, and in a consumeristic society they are often luxury material goods, objects or experiences that cost a lot of money and cannot be afforded by many people and thus function as status symbols. These tend to often be dismissed as inauthentic goods, not only by moral philosophers but also by sociologists and psychologists, for good reasons: evidence shows that they do not actually bring happiness, and one of the reasons why they don’t is that agents are caught up in an arms race, which is never-ending and collectively damaging (see, e.g., Frank 1999). But there are positional goods that are not so easily rejected as false idols: educational pedigrees are one such case. An Ivy League degree has value also (some might say primarily) in virtue of the social currency it carries, and not just because of the education that is expected to be associated with it, as is shown by the success of many an underachieving student who can nevertheless tout having graduated from a prestigious institution (the list of US presidents provides some examples). These degrees are prized because it is very difficult to be admitted to one of those schools. Similarly with publications: the higher the rejection rate of a journal the better the journal is taken to be…Groucho Marx’s joke that he does not want to be a member of a club that admits him relies in part on this truth.
地位財和社會地位有關，在消費至上的風氣中往往是奢侈品或花大錢的享受，非一般人負擔得起的，而成為社會地位的象徵。
哲學家、社會學家和心理學家等等，也都不認為這種地位財是真的好東西，它們不見得會帶來快樂，為什麼呢？其中一個原因是大家都不斷在上面競逐比較，一山還比一山高，結果(幾乎)大家都變成了輸家。
畢業於常春藤這樣的學校，也是一種地位財。一方面它們產生了很多功成名就的校友，另外一方面這些學校的錄取率很低，造成物以稀為貴的效果。
頂尖的期刋，有類似的效應。投稿的退件率極高，造成能在上面刋出文章，是非常得了的事。
美國早期的喜劇演員馬克斯因此曾經幽默地說，他不會加入任何會允許他加入的俱樂部(因為不允許他加入，那麼難加入的俱樂部，才值得他加入！)
…It is not simply that our conception of the self, of our talents, of our character is inherently comparative. It is our conception of pretty much anything that matters that is based on interpersonal comparisons, and, in many cases, it is strictly dependent on one’s position in those comparison scales. This is especially true with regard to scarce or finite resources, but we live in a world where socioeconomic inequalities are rising and natural resources are diminishing.
大意：拼命兢逐和比較地位財，並不是代表人是不理性的，而是因為我們的自我形象，就是透過人與人之間的比較，而逐漸建立起來的，而且往往是基於自己到底是位於那個總體分佈的哪一個位置來決定的，尤其是在那些比較稀缺的資源上面。很不幸地，這個世界貧富愈來愈不均，社會愈來愈不公平。
…..
相對於地位財的另外一端，是所謂的非地位財(Non-positional goods)，譬如休閒、愛情、健康、自由、自主性、歸屬感、環境等等。
地位財是比較來的，但是非地位財並無法自外於比較的影響：
But many of the objects and properties described above rely on comparison in a second, epistemic sense: their standards are set through comparison, as I illustrated at the beginning. Whether I am perceived by others as healthy, beautiful, intelligent,and so forth depends on how I compare to others in my comparison class, on community standards, on ideas of “normality” and “function” that cannot but be comparative. Thus, I have made a metaphysical claim (that much human goodness depends on implicit or explicit rankings and positionality) and an epistemic one (that we use implicit or explicit comparison to know what position we occupy in this continuum of goodness).
大意就是說，就算像健康這種非地位財，我們到底多健康，也是透過比較其他的人，比較和我們同一級別的人，比較社群內的標準，來了解自己身體的正常程度或(各器官)功能狀況。而這些，不外都是透過比較而來的。因此我可以昭告天下，在形而上學上(人類感受好的程度，基於隱晦的或明顯的排序及位置來決定)，而在形而下的認識論上來說(我們是用隱晦的或明顯的比較，去探知我們到底在好的程度中，佔據到什麼樣位置來決定)
…..
所以，結論還是出於比較(comparison)，是分別心。
而這不就是嫉妒、羨慕以及其他更多不滿的情緒，所帶來給我們人類的痛苦嗎？
我夠好嗎？我這輩子過得好嗎？然後我們透過比較其他的人，想知道好不好、有多好。想要透過這個方式，知道自己是誰，然後感到痛苦。
佛家針對這個命題，是採取正本清源的方法：不要有分别心。
正如金剛經中說的：「……諸菩薩摩訶薩，應如是生清淨心，不應住色生心，不應住聲、香、味、觸、法生心，應無所住，而生其心。」
不應住，就不要有分別心。
色即是空，空即是色。
「……不取於相，如如不動。何以故？一切有為法，如夢、幻、泡、影；如露，亦如電，應作如是觀。」(金剛經)
既然一切皆如夢、幻、泡、影、露、電，何需拿來比較而徒生煩惱呢？
應無所住而生其心。
《The philosophy of envy》的作者認為，羨慕(Envy)自有其推動社會進步的正面價值，如果無法不比較，無法無所住而生其心，能夠這樣正面的去思考，也是無妨。
*：Sara Protasi, 《The philosophy of envy》, 2021, Cambridge University Press
2024/8/5 The philosophy of envy Damakey
